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Cultural artefacts are stolen from temples andunderground sites in “source” countries. The list ofsource countries is long, but the most high proﬁle
cases of looting have been in respect of Egypt, Italy, Peru,
Mexico, Greece, Turkey, and China. Antiquities are highly
collectable for reasons both of value and of aesthetics, and
there are several prominent international centres for trade,
most notably London, New York, Paris, Brussels, Hong
Kong, Geneva and Bangkok. The two largest market
centres for the sale of antiquities, in terms of volume of
trade, are New York and London. The UK is widely
acknowledged to be a signiﬁcant market for looted
antiquities in global terms, both by way of “end point” in
the chain of supply, and as a transit point for looted
antiquities which will subsequently leave the country.
Antiquities looted from source countries have in the past
routinely traveled to London to be sold by international
dealers and auction houses to other dealers, private
collectors and museums.
Critics of the market suggest that this trafﬁc continues.
Source states from which looted objects are exported for
sale have responded to the problem with a two-pronged
legal approach: vesting legislation and export controls.
“State vesting” legislation, as we will call it here, follows a
similar model across many source countries: objects over a
certain age, usually 100 years old, in the ground are
declared to be the property of the state, making their
ﬁnding and removal a theft from the state. Integral parts of
national monuments are often also expressly declared to
attract criminal sanction if removed. Export controls
usually take the form of licence requirements. Objects of
artistic or cultural interest over 100 years old should not be
exported without a licence, which will be granted by the
state arts or antiquities department. Despite these
restrictions at source, many countries continue to report
widespread looting and unauthorized export of their
underground heritage.
Strategies of regulation at the demand end of the chain
of supply have been thought potentially capable of
achieving a sanitising effect on the market and it is under
this broad philosophy of demand-reduction as applied to
illicit antiquities that the Dealing in Cultural Objects
(Offences) Act 2003 Act appears. The 2003 Act, an
apparent attempt to confront the illicit element of the
London antiquities market, was put before Parliament as a
Private Member’s Bill, taking effect as law on December
30, 2003. The Act in section 1 provides for a sentence on
conviction on indictment of up to seven years
imprisonment and/or a ﬁne, where a person:
dishonestly deals in a cultural object that is tainted,
knowing or believing that the object is tainted.
Under section 2 of the Act, a cultural object is “tainted”
if it is excavated, or removed from a monument or other
building or structure of historical, architectural or
archaeological interest, and such excavation or removal
constitutes an offence. It is stated to be immaterial whether
the excavation or removal took place in the UK or
elsewhere. The intended effect of this legislation is
therefore to criminalise (and by implication deter) the
knowing possession or trade in the UK of antiquities
looted either here or abroad.
The purpose of the research reported here was to
evaluate the impact of the Act on the UK market and its
role in the international illicit market. The ﬁrst phase of
the research was a postal survey which targeted the 89
people and institutions we identiﬁed as being signiﬁcant
informants in relation to London’s antiquities market. The
survey achieved a response rate of 24, which therefore
represents about a quarter of the London market and its
attendant spectators, commentators and regulators as we
had originally identiﬁed them.
In the second phase of the research, interviews were
conducted with targeted key respondents in London,
Oxford, Cambridge, Cairo and Bangkok. The total number
of interviews was 38. The interviews were qualitative in
method, meaning that their goal was less to elicit
quantiﬁable data than to gain, in an interpretive vein,
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insight into what the 2003 Act means to actors “on the
ground.” We can provide a general breakdown of the actors
we interviewed, as follows:
• Five dealers from a selection of the most prominent
dealerships in London;
• Five “specialists” with expertise in observing,
researching and commenting on the illicit market;
• Three specialist law enforcement representatives,
including a private investigator, a member of the
Metropolitan Police’s Art and Antiquities Squad, and a
specialist from customs;
• Four respondents in senior positions drawn from the
UK’s museums sector, including prestigious museums,
their major funding sources and associations
established to provide collaborative spaces for
discussions of matters of museum governance;
• Two key actors in the legislative process who played
central inﬂuential roles in the design and/or passage
into force of the 2003 Act;
• Five respondents in Thailand, including a senior ﬁgure
in the National Museum, a senior ﬁgure in the legal
arm of the Fine Arts Department, a dealer and two
archaeologists (one local, one foreign);
• Thirteen respondents in Egypt, including senior
representatives of the Supreme Council of Antiquities,
foreign and local archaeologists, specialist academics
and a senior representative of the Egyptian museum.
THE SURVEY DATA
The survey produced the following data:
Respondents
What was the balance of trade/non-trade response to the
survey? The survey was designed to be ﬁlled out
anonymously if the respondent so desired, with the result
that we cannot categorise respondents in this way unless
they identiﬁed themselves on the form or otherwise made
clear their afﬁliation in their answers. In fact, the vast
majority of respondents were identiﬁable in this way.
Therefore we can say that 58 per cent of respondents were
deﬁnitely from the trade, 29 per cent were not (ie they fell
into the categories of regulators, commentators,
archaeologists and other specialists), and in respect of the
rest (13%) afﬁliation is unknown.
Self-regulation
Seventy ﬁve per sent of respondents thought the trade
required formal regulation, and that self-regulation was not
adequate to prevent the purchase of illicit antiquities by the
trade. This is against 25 per cent who thought that the
trade could effectively self-regulate.
Knowledge of the 2003 Act
Seventy one per cent of respondents reported familiarity
with the requirements of the 2003 Act; 17 per cent
reported no such familiarity and 12 per cent did not
answer this question on the survey.
Effect of the 2003 Act
Asked if they thought the impact of the Act on the trade
in antiquities in London “has been or will be positive or
negative”, the majority of answers were neither. Seventeen
per cent thought the effect positive only, and 8 per cent
thought it negative only. Twelve point ﬁve per cent thought
the effect to be both positive and negative, while the
greatest proportion, 29 per cent of respondents, declined
to answer the question as it was put but instead wrote that
they thought the Act had been and/or would be “neutral”,
“minimal” or “little” in its effect, or would be
“ineffective.”
Perceived change in market
Asked whether they had noticed a change in the way
dealers operate as a result of the Act, 50 per cent of
respondents said they had seen no change, 21 per cent said
they had noticed a change, and 29 per cent did not
respond. The 21 per cent that had noticed change
represents ﬁve responses, of which one suggested any
change noticed was “purely cosmetic” and had in effect
driven the market “more underground or more under the
counter than it was before”, one simply noted that the Art
Newspaper had reported a small number of dealers
relocating abroad, and another claimed to perceive “less
activity” in the market due to “despondency.” None of
these responses would seem to accord with the aims of the
2003 Act. “Purely cosmetic” adaptation, dealer relocation
and “despondency” have occurred precisely because a
characterisation of the trade as bifurcated between
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” dealers is in error.
Illegitimate objects pass through the “legitmate” trade and
therefore any regulatory attention paid to such objects will,
rather than support “legitimate” dealers by eliminating
their “illegitimate” peers, directly affect the business of the
trade generally.
However, the Act appears to have been ineffective in
achieving any substantial effect on the trade: the most
important ﬁnding here for an evaluation of the Act is that
half of respondents, and a signiﬁcant majority of those who
responded to this speciﬁc question, had seen no change in
market routines as a result of the passage of the Act.
Change in personal routines
This question was asked only to trade respondents.
Asked whether their knowledge of the Act had affected the
way they carried on business, or whether it would in the
future, 64 per cent said no, 22 per cent said yes (although
in some cases only “formal” change was planned), and 9
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there was 14 per cent non-response. The detail of these
responses is important to understand their character
within this statistical distribution. The majority “no
change” group generally saw no reason to change their
routines which they saw to be adequate to constitute
legitimate dealing and therefore most unlikely to trigger an
offence under the 2003 Act. That the majority of traders
surveyed have not and do not intend to alter their activities
in light of the Act must be seen to be a signiﬁcant failing of
the legislation unless the “bad apples” market story is
believed.
There is considerable evidence that there are bad apples
in the antiquities trade, as there are in any business
enterprise, in the sense of individuals or organisations who
willingly break the law or violate social or moral norms of
behaviour. There is also, however, considerable evidence
that the problem of dealing in illicit antiquities is an issue
that affects the “legitimate” trade insofar as looted
antiquities are bought and sold as part of the general
routine dealing activity of the open trade, often it seems
without direct knowledge of the illicit nature of an object
due to a lack of provenance information. The absence of
thorough and effective provenance investigation has
become routinised in the trade, in the UK as elsewhere,
and as such in some deals made on the “legitimate”
market, illicit objects are traded with no direct knowledge
as to whether they have been looted or not. Importantly,
although perhaps obviously, this means that these objects
could have been looted.
Bad apples
There was no speciﬁc question asking whether
respondents were of the opinion that problems relating to
looted antiquities in the trade were the work of a perceived
minority of “bad apples” or whether the problem infected
the trade as a whole. However, responses to the survey
questions are noteworthy in that 25 per cent of
respondents (6 in number) attributed problems in the
trade to “bad apples”, suggesting that a small sector of the
trade was untrustworthy and should not be associated with
the legitimate trade. Of these six respondents, ﬁve were
from the trade. Thus, 36 per cent of the trade respondents
associated the problem of looting with “bad apples”
without being prompted by a speciﬁc question to that
effect. Given that this response was unprompted, we
suggest that the “bad apples” opinion carries signiﬁcant
weight in a diagnosis of the trade’s relationship with the
looting problem. In keeping with previous research, we
suggest that this represents a somewhat pious and
complacent view on the part of dealers who may well
themselves be dealing in illicit antiquities, perhaps
unwittingly.
THE INTERVIEW DATA
The conceptual starting point for an analysis of the data is
the market reduction model of crime reduction strategy in
relation to markets in illicit commodities as developed by
Mike Sutton and colleagues and published by the Policing
and Reducing Crime Unit at the Home Ofﬁce. The 2003
Act on the face of it would seem to ﬁt with a market
reduction philosophy: in a simpliﬁed model of the
movement of goods from source to market, that criminal
sanctions applied to the purchase of illicit material in the
market will reduce the uptake of such purchase
opportunities; that this reduction in sales will ﬁlter back to
the “suppliers” of the market, the middle-men; and that the
reduction of demand among the customers of these middle-
market traders will result in a concomitant reduction in
their demand for illicit antiquities from the looters who take
objects from the ground in source countries.
The market reduction approach (MRA) also
acknowledges the structural parameters within which
certain property crimes occur, for example the “strain”
experienced by consumers who cannot afford products
heavily advertised as fashionable or otherwise desirable.
Sensibly, the model proposes that attending to the
provision of alternative legitimate routes to the realisation
of these goals for individuals or businesses will reduce the
incentive to ﬁnd or accept illegal means of goal-
satisfaction. This might be characterised as a “harm
reduction” component to the regulation of illicit markets
and can be seen to form a complement in the model to the
more traditional “penal deterrence” component outlined
above and which, in our analysis, informs the 2003 Act.
The translation of the MRA model to the antiquities
market is problematic, however. In a market which
functions without the serious transmission of provenance
(ie information about the history of ownership of an
object), illicit dealing is seen as a standard risk, and
remains so despite the creation of the offence in the 2003
Act. Dealers, in other words, are not deterred by virtue of
the new legislation:
“So, stolen goods, yes, they must be here. Possibly over the
course of time 10 per cent of my stock has probably been
stolen at one time or another…I don’t know, but it would
not surprise me if it was that high...either stolen in China, or
wherever, you just don’t know” (London dealer).
The 2003 Act is perceived by dealers and regulators alike
as an ineffective control mechanism. A law enforcement
respondent put it pithily: “they passed a dead duck there.”
We can identify the failings of the 2003 Act in terms of a
series of “problems” which are given clear form by the
data, and which come together to undermine the impact of
the legislation. These are the problems of:
1. proof;
2. national self interest and political will;
3. how the 2003 Act ﬁts into the overall structure of
regulation of antiquities dealing in the UK;
4. power.10
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I cannot address each of these problems here in any
great depth, but interested readers might like to obtain a
copy of the full research report in respect of this project,
which will be made available on the Scottish Centre for
Crime and Justice Research website at www.sccjr.ac.uk.
The problem of proof
The problem of proof in relation to the 2003 Act arises
in relation to three related matters:
(a) The non-retroactivity of the operative provisions
of the Act
The 2003 Act came into force on December 30, 2003.
It is not retroactive and therefore a “tainted” object is only
such if it has been stolen after that date. This clearly
restricts the application of the Act in respect of objects
already in circulation in the market on that date. More
seriously, in any successful prosecution it must be proven
that the object in question was stolen after the above date.
This perpetuates a problem of proof that existed for
prosecutors under the law prior to 2003. The sites from
which antiquities are stolen are often isolated, their
contents are known only to the ﬁnders, and they cross
national borders without being recognised or recorded. In
these circumstances, it is very difﬁcult indeed to establish
proof of the date of theft of an object which has appeared
on the market without accurate accompanying information
relating to its date of ﬁnding.
(b) The absence of provision for enforcement of
breach of foreign export prohibition
Objects which have been exported in breach of a foreign
export restriction are not included in the deﬁnition of
“tainted” under the 2003 Act and as such a considerable
proportion of illicit antiquities are excluded from its scope.
This could have been an effective site of intervention into
the illicit market for the 2003 Act had it been decided to
follow examples of international illicit market regulation
for other commodities, such as the CITES regulation of the
international movement of protected wildlife, which
encourage countries to sight export documentation from
source before allowing import. The opportunity to tie
import into the UK with licit export overseas was not taken
for antiquities however.
(c) The difficulty of availability of evidence in
relation to the central “knowing or believing”
provision
Proving that a defendant was aware, to the extent of
“knowing or believing”, that an object he or she dealt in
was tainted, in practical terms renders unworkable the
offence the Act creates. At the same time this wording
serves to undermine the basic message that unites all critics
of the market: that effective due diligence in relation to
object provenance needs to become an essential
component of any purchase of antiquities.
The problem of national self-interest and political
will
The 2003 Act is designed to play a role in the control of
London’s part in the international market in illicit
antiquities. As London is a central market for the sale of
antiquities which originate, and in some cases have been
stolen from, overseas, this mission involves the acceptance
by the UK government of a role in policing crimes which
predominantly affect the interests of foreign powers. In
fact, the idea of the protection of the interests of humanity
generally – “the world’s history”, “our common cultural
heritage” and other such emotive terminology – is lost in
the practical implementation of a system of resource
prioritisation which inevitably occurs in the routine
conduct of policing in the context of limited funding and
manpower.
The problem of national self-interest does not only
manifest itself in relation to the priorities of market
countries like the UK. Source countries have a reputation
for similar stubborn insularity in addressing the problem of
the looting of artefacts within their jurisdiction and their
export. This source “nationalism” has been criticised as
exacerbating the problem of the illicit market by
encouraging the creation of a black market in looted
antiquities as a result of overbearing source country
excavation laws and export controls. Our interviews in
Thailand and Egypt conﬁrm the existence of
“nationalistic” retentive attitudes towards cultural property
in these source countries. This may well be considered
rather normal insofar as pride in a national cultural
heritage and the desire to prevent the theft and national
loss-through-export of that heritage might be considered
sensible, natural “sovereign emotions” which any country’s
more culturally-sensitive inhabitants and governors might
be expected to feel. Unfortunately, despite the seeming
reasonableness of such national interest, our research
supports the “black market” theory: that harsh controls at
source create pressure for illicit export where market
demand externally remains constant.
The problem of how the 2003 Act fits into the
overall structure of regulation of antiquities dealing,
import and export in the UK
This problem incorporates elements of the problem of
proof above. The problem of proof is severe, and when the
2003 Act is held alongside other avenues of prosecution,
which permit of a greater chance of success in court, the
offence in the 2003 Act ﬁnds itself languishing at the
bottom of the toolbox available to the police, the CPS and
customs. Thus, there have been no concluded prosecutions
in terms of the offence in the 2003 Act.
The problem of power
At issue here is the capacity “powerful” constituencies
have to protect their interests. In our study, the powerful
constituency is the antiquities market, including some
museums and collectors, but particularly comprised of a
core of active dealers and their lawyers. This group has
managed to achieve such a high level of representation in
ofﬁcial circles that their interests have become fused with
the more “controlling” elements of the 2003 Act. Market
interests were in fact in considerable degree constitutive of
the 2003 Act, and in this way a picture emerges of a market
taking a leading role in its own regulation. This is not self-
regulation, however. Rather it is a form of legislative
inﬂuence corrosive of the regulatory mechanism; a
purposive and forceful watering-down of the laws that
govern a certain market sector through a process of
inclusion in discussions around appropriate levels of
control at the time the law was drafted.
Positive effects of the 2003 Act
The data are not uniformly dismissive of the effect of the
2003 Act, however. Despite the lack of prosecutions and
the other problems, theoretical and practical, with the Act
listed above, there is evidence that some members of the
trade have been affected by the new legislation.
Generally, the reaction from the trade which we have
distilled from our interviews and our observations of the
market more generally has been one of a cautious and more
reﬂexive “business as usual.” As one of our specialist
informants euphemistically put it: “the impact of the Act is
not instantly evident!” Dealers generally appear to engage
in the same transaction routines as before the
implementation of the 2003 Act, encouraged by the
general (accurate) perception of a culture of non-
enforcement around the new legislation. They remain
conscious that at this relatively early stage in the aftermath
of legislative activity this period of non-enforcement might
come to an end, but we might hypothesise that the longer
the period of enforcement inactivity continues, the more
conﬁdent the market will become in the permanence of
this state of affairs and the more likely it is that old dealer
routines will persist.
That said, some dealers have reportedly begun to
implement changes in their patterns of dealing as a result
of the 2003 Act. One dealer in our sample in particular
asserted that he was taking the new legislation very
seriously and that his ofﬁce had “cut down dramatically on
things we buy from Hong Kong.” In criminological terms,
this reaction might be interpreted as the self-control of an
individual particularly susceptible to criminal justice
deterrence.
Dealer: You mean, why am I self policing in this
manner?
Interviewer: Yes.
Dealer: Well, I just think that the law…I mean, the
general view in the trade is that the law is difﬁcult to
enforce and a bit toothless…although obviously the
penalties are quite large, essentially. My own view is that
laws might start off like that, but you never know, they
might change one day! You just need a couple of zealots
to go around trying to enforce it and the whole aspect
of it changes quite rapidly. I don’t like the idea of
dealing with that sword of Damocles hanging over my
head.
It would be mistaken, on our reading of the market, to
take this extreme self-policing as common among market
actors, although some level of self-policing is characteristic
of the “semi-conscious state of siege” (London dealer)
which typiﬁes the current market reaction to the new Act.
Perhaps the most important latent potential the Act has
is its cumulative effect. Problems of drafting and other
issues with the practical workability of the legislation as it
stands aside, the problem of non-retroactivity becomes less
of a restraint to prosecution as time passes. It is harder to
break the law put in place by the 2003 Act now than it will
be in ﬁve years time, simply due to the increased number
of objects which will be excavated in that time, and
therefore which will fall foul of the Act. However, in the
absence of mechanisms of object provenance identiﬁcation
it will remain very difﬁcult to prove date of excavation.
Implications for policy
The MRA works where buyers of stolen goods feel that
they are under a level of law enforcement scrutiny such
that an illegal purchase will have adverse consequences for
them. Deterrence theory traditionally has comprised of
three elements: certainty (that is, likelihood of being
caught); celerity (that is, swiftness of punishment); and
severity (that is, a punishment of a level that is thought
sufﬁcient to provide a disincentive to law-breaking). The
offence in the 2003 Act has failed to have a market
reduction effect because although it may satisfy the severity
test – and possibly the celerity test although without cases
to study this is difﬁcult to say – it falls down on the most
basic premise of deterrence; likelihood of detection and
punishment. The dealers in our sample were well aware
that the police are largely unable to detect the crime of
dealing in tainted cultural objects, for the several reasons
set out in our research report and adverted to here.
Rather than attempting to close down the antiquities
market by means of criminal deterrence targeted at illicit
dealing, another option might involve working towards a
compromise between the market and source countries.
This would involve a shift in the weight attached to internal
components of the MRA. The MRA component currently
prioritised in UK policy approaches to the market, and
embodied in the 2003 Act is punishment-based
deterrence, focused on market purchase. In addition to the
penal component of the MRA – which focuses on reducing
the number of stolen goods passing into a market – is the
desire of the MRA model to attend to structural “strains”
which underpin stolen goods markets. Thus we might
consider mechanisms to legitimate the goods passing into12
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the market; maintaining the market while reducing the
damage it causes. This is a “harm reduction” approach to
stolen goods markets which asks “what is the harm that
this market causes, and what can we do about it?”
In the antiquities market the damage caused by looting is
predominantly to the archaeological record, and secondarily
to the ﬁnancial interest of source countries in their heritage.
Several examples of schemes for the sponsored excavation,
cataloguing, division and sale of antiquities have been
practised over the years, and many market participants
support the idea of such schemes, which are said to involve
beneﬁt for all: for archaeologists who conduct the digs and
can gather their data; the market which receives a share of
the ﬁnds (in some models in return for sponsorship); and
the source state which exercises control over proceedings
and decides which objects to release to the market and
which to retain. The suggestion that these schemes may
provide a panacea for the current problems in the
antiquities market often meets with disapproval from
archaeologists, however, who argue that (amongst other
things) legitimating a section of the market will not
discourage illicit dealing, and may indeed provide
opportunity and motive for greater illicit activity. There are
in fact many serious objections to such a model of market
sanitization, and clearly the application of a harm-reduction
strategy through this mechanism is problematic on many
fronts. Yet the structure of regulation we have now is not
working, and further thought about alternative models of
engagement with the problem remains a useful activity.
The regulation of the international market in antiquities
does not have to be a zero sum game, and to achieve the
mutual beneﬁts which can occur from market
reconstruction, a shift in the philosophy of the UK’s
intervention is required so that the structural dictates of
the MRA model are given due weight alongside its more
penal dictates. International co-operation towards
worthwhile harm-reduction approaches, combined always
with an effective deterrent for dealing outside any such co-
operative schemes as are erected or revived, appears a
more productive route to market sanitization than the bare
implementation of the penal part of the MRA model which
currently informs the philosophy of UK intervention into
the market. It is hoped that the Department of Culture,
Media and Sport will turn its attention to exploring
possibilities for such international collaborative
approaches, rather than investing further in the
“crackdown’ approach which has been shown here to be so
problematic. In respect of what precise form a harm-
reduction model for the antiquities market might take,
further research is needed.
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Institute News
European Commission funds
summer course in EU law,
institutions and drafting
The IALS has received funding from the European
Commission to offer a summer course in EU law,
institutions and drafting for EU membership and
accession. The course will be offered in the summer of
2008 to postgraduate students from the EU, and is funded
by the Jean Monnet programme of the European
Commission.
MA in taxation to be offered
next year
A new masters programme in taxation is to be launched
by the IALS for 2008-09.
The MA in taxation (law, administration and practice) is
a brand new degree in the context of the University of
London and, with one exception, a totally new degree in
the UK. The programme aims to give an opportunity for
those who are already devoting, or intending to devote,
their professional lives to the ﬁeld of taxation to study the
topic from an academic perspective. It is likely to attract
students with ﬁrst degrees in a range of disciplines and will
complement the ongoing teaching of taxation in the new,
college-based LLM degrees.
Report says Public Defender
Service provides vital protection
The results of a major, independent evaluation of the
Public Defender Service (PDS) in England and Wales were
published on July 31 by The Stationery Ofﬁce.
The research was conducted by a team consisting of
Professors Lee Bridges of the University of Warwick; Ed
Cape of the University of the West of England; Richard
Moorhead of the University of Cardiff; and Avrom Sherr of
the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. Professor Bridges,
who led the research team, said:
